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Discourse Theory on Ideas and Policy Reform: the Case of the Life Course 
Arrangement 
 
 
Abstract 
How do new policy ideas enter the dominant policy discourse and how do they manage to 
change these discourses and policy practices? Béland and Cox (2010) argue that most 
ideational analyses of changes are agency-centered, which means that changes result 
from people’s choices, which are shaped by the (intersubjective) ideas they hold. This 
paper, however, draws on poststructuralist discourse theory, which, instead of assuming 
the existence of real intransitive agents and structures with causal powers, is based upon 
the idea of radical contingency of objectivity. Using this theoretical perspective, two 
purposes are being served. On the one hand, this study further develops discourse 
theoretical poststructuralist concepts as methodological tools for policy analysis. On the 
other hand, by applying these concepts to the case of the introduction of individual 
savings arrangements in the Dutch collective social security system, this paper offers a 
refreshing perspective on processes of policy change and permanence. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In 2006 the Life Course Arrangement (LCA), a fiscally facilitated individual savings 
instrument for the financing of leave, was introduced in Dutch social security law. The 
adoption of the LCA , as well as the amendments proposed thereafter, shows that the idea 
of individual savings accounts for social risks has become firmly established within the 
Dutch policy discourse. These developments are, however, puzzling in the context of the 
long Dutch tradition of collective social security arrangements, which seems to confirm 
the well-known new institutionalist claim that social security institutions tend to remain 
stable during long periods of time (Pierson 2001). Moreover, the argument has been put 
forward, especially with respect to corporatist societies like the Netherlands, that labor 
unions tend to impede major social reforms (Hemerijck & Visser, 1997; Kuipers, 2004).  
 
A plausible explanation for emerging ruptures in the collective social insurance system is 
offered by scholars in the field in ideational analysis, who argue that the availability of 
new ideas may cause existing structures to alter (Cox, 2001; Hay, 2002; Blyth, 2002; 
Schmidt, 2002). How then, according to ideational theory, do new ideas such as the 
notion of individual savings arrangements actually change existing institutional 
structures? First of all, it must be noted that there are several ideational approaches, 
varying from rational choice based ideational approaches to constructivist ideational 
approaches (Gofas & Hay, 2008). Yet, as Béland and Cox (2010) have argued, what most 
ideational analyses of changes share is that they are agency-centered.: 
 
“[w]hat things change and how they change are all the result of what people choose to do in response to the 
world in which they find themselves (…) these choices are shaped by the ideas people hold and debate with 
others. These ideas, in turn, are based on interpretations people have of the world and of those around 
them” 
 (Béland and Cox, 2010, p.12).  
 
To be successful, an idea  “[t]he idea must capture the attention of actors who advocate 
for it and successfully use it to influence the observed outcome” (2010, p.13). Béland and 
Cox thus foreground the role of intentionally acting agents. 
 
Scholars in the field of ideational analysis also point at some unsettled issues in this field 
of policy analysis. In the first place, while ideational analysis may decouple ideas from 
interests, it still cannot adequately explain why policy actors identify with those new 
ideas (Hay 2010). A second, related problem is that ideational analysis cannot explain 
how ideology affects people’s choices, since this impact is not measurable (Béland & 
Cox 2010). Thirdly, as Schmidt (2008) argues, it often remains unclear how policy actors 
move from ideas to action. She therefore urges that more attention is given to collective 
and structural processes to explain the process of policy change and permanence. 
Nevertheless, following philosophers like Searle and Habermas, Schmidt still 
foregrounds the role of intentionally acting (situated) agents who seek to enforce changes 
through discourse. 
 
This focus on intentionally acting agents struggling with ideas has been challenged in 
poststructuralist approaches to policy analysis. For example, Finlayson (2007) holds that 
ideational analysis has wrongly examined ideas instead of arguments, since it views 
argumentation strategies or rhetoric as merely instrumental to policy goals. Instead, he 
has argued for an analysis of the constitutive function of rhetoric. Others have pointed at 
the role of fantasy in the process of policy change and permanence (Glynos & Howarth, 
2007). This paper suggests that discourse theoretical solutions for the aforementioned 
issues in ideational analysis make it possible to explain why actors identified with certain 
new ideas and how these ideas were sedimented within existing social structures. In this 
respect this paper also challenges the claim Hay’s  that “postmodernist perspectives (…) 
largely disavow[s] explanation as the privileging of one subject position over others” 
(2011, p.171). 
 
As shown below in the account of the adoption of the LCA, poststructuralist approaches 
to policy analysis offer a refreshing perspective on policy analysis in that they focus on 
the constitutive role of rhetoric, subconscious identification processes, and the role of 
conflict and resistance in processes of change and permanence. 
 
An outline of  discourse theoretical approaches is provided in next section. The first 
empirical sections, sections 5 and 6, show how a new perspective emerged in the Dutch 
social security discourse: the life course perspective. Section 7 examines how in an 
atmosphere of conflict, disagreement and compromise, these new ideas ultimately 
resulted in a political decision on the establishment of the LCA. The last empirical 
sections (8-10) reveal how, despite the continuous struggles and conflicts in the policy 
process, the idea of an individual savings arrangement managed to take root in the social 
policy discourse. 
 
2. Discourse theoretical approaches to change  
Let us first consider the discourse theoretical distinction between the ontic and the 
ontological level of analysis. The ontic refers to a particular domain, phenomenon or 
discourse, which is understood as an “articulatory practice” that establishes relationships 
“among elements such that their identity is modified” (Laclau & Mouffe 1985, p. 105). 
The ontological , in contrast, refers to the categorical preconditions for such objects and 
their investigation. That is, in order to understand processes of change and permanence 
we should first study the ontological preconditions of the objects. As Glynos and 
Howarth (2007) argue, on a micro level of analysis the study of rhetoric can be helpful to 
gain an understanding of these categorical preconditions, because rhetorical patterns 
“shape our language use and meaning in non-conscious ways” and, accordingly, give 
shape to the ontological preconditions of the ontic objects (Glynos & Howarth 2007, p. 
75). This implies that rhetoric is not merely instrumental to policy goals or ideas, but 
itself can be constitutive of new ideas (Finlayson, 2007). 
 
Norval’s concepts of “aspect dawning” and “aspect change” shed further light on the 
relationship between rhetorical arguments and the constitution of new ideas. She uses 
Wittgenstein’s example of the rabbit/duck picture to explain her point. The moment in 
which a subject suddenly discovers a picture of a rabbit, which she earlier regarded as a 
picture of a duck, is what Norval calls “aspect dawning;” unexpectedly, the subject has 
discovered a new aspect. This is a moment of surprise: Now it is a rabbit! At the same 
time, however, the subject notices that the picture has not changed. In other words, in the 
new perspective, continuity and discontinuity occur. This is what Norval calls “aspect 
change”: seeing the duck now differs from the moment before the rabbit was discovered 
(Norval 2007). Rhetorical moves may thus, within a general frame of continuity, cause 
people to see things in different ways and generate change accordingly.  
 
Discourse theoretical studies use the concept of dislocation to explain changes on the 
level of the state. Dislocationary moments, may include the effects of an economic crisis, 
processes of commodification, bureaucratization or globalization (Laclau 1990, pp. 52-
65). According to Laclau and Mouffe (1985), the experience of a dislocationary event 
causes subjects to see the contingent basis of sedimented social practices. The subject 
suddenly realizes that things are not necessarily the way they seem. As a result, signifiers 
are no longer fixed to a particular meaning and begin to float. These floating signifiers 
are only partly stabilized when they are successfully incorporated into dominant 
discourses, capable of a new fixation of meaning. 
 
Yet, as Glynos and Howarth argue persuasively, a dislocation does not necessarily 
generate change. That is, change can only be expected if a brief glimpse of the contingent 
basis of social practices causes people to challenge (the norms underlying) social 
practices (2007, pp. 121-124). In this situation equivalential chains between different 
particular demands can be constructed against the current hegemonic regime. As a result, 
this regime may be overthrown and a new hegemonic regime is established. For example, 
during Thatcherite populism the antagonisms constituted around dislocationary processes 
of bureaucratization were constructed around two poles: the people, which included 
everyone defending traditional family values and the freedom of enterprise, and their 
opponents: the state and their subversives such as feminists, blacks and young people 
(Laclau & Mouffe 1985, p.170). In contrast to these logics of equivalence, the logics of 
difference seek to keep different elements separate and autonomous, causing relatively 
small institutional changes (Glynos & Howarth 2007, pp. 141-145). The logics of 
difference dominate when different demands are fulfilled such as, for example, in the 
modern welfare state (Laclau 2005, p. 78). Still, as Laclau argues, within a hegemonic 
regime we can find both logics of equivalence and difference. 
 
In recent years, insights drawn from Lacanian psychoanalytics have been added to the 
interplay between logics of equivalence and difference. Discourse theoretical scholars 
argue that fantasies are essential to the process of social change, because they sustain 
existing or emerging discourses. In this view, the subject identifies with new fantasies 
because he or she is an internally split subject and constantly seeking new fullness 
(Stravrakakis, 1999; Laclau, 2005; Glynos & Howarth, 2007). Glynos and Howarth 
mention two kinds of fantasmatic dimensions in policy narratives: the “beatific 
dimension” of fantasy, which “promises a fullness-to-come once a named or implied 
obstacle is overcome,” and  the “horrific dimension” of fantasy, which “foretells of 
disaster if the obstacle proves insurmountable” (2007, p. 147). In some instances the 
logics of fantasy are closely related to political demands. For example, the logics of 
equivalence may create ontological links between different demands through the 
construction of an enemy within, such as “the Muslim minorities.” The construction of 
the logics of difference, on the other hand, can be sustained by a fantasmatic narrative in 
which an enemy without is created that takes away the national identity, such as 
“globalizing forces.”   
 
Hence, discourse theorists as Glynos and Howarth hold a different concept of the subject 
than scholars in the field of ideational analysis. Most important, they do not, as most 
ideational scholars, assume the existence of agents as real intransitive objects with causal 
powers. Although they agree with interpretive scholars that social agents always find 
themselves “thrown into” a system of meaningful practices (Bevir & Rhodes 2005), for 
them, structures can never fully determine the identity of these agents, because structures 
are always incomplete. According to Glynos and Howarth, then, “the whole point of 
poststructuralists theories of language and human subjectivity is to problematize the idea 
of a fully-present subject and a fully constituted linguistic structure” (2007, p. 78). By 
deconstructing the opposition between structure and agency, Glynos and Howarth 
centralize the role of power and ideology with respect to the (always “lacking”) 
constitution of social structures and new forms of life.  
 
In summary, Glynos and Howarth spotlight the (unawareness of the) political moment 
inherent in the identification with new ideas that constitute new  regimes of practices. At 
a macro level of analysis the emergence of new hegemonic regimes is primarily caused 
by a dislocationary event followed by the construction of new chains of equivalences and 
differences. At a lower level of analysis change may occur because rhetorical forms in 
which new ideas are presented cause subjects to experience the contingencies of existing 
hegemonic practices. For example, according to Norval policy change is, above all, 
conditioned upon a first moment of surprise in which, due to new rhetorical forms, the 
same things are see in a different way. Yet on both levels of analysis fantasmatic 
identifications with those new ideas determine the speed and the direction of new 
policies. Thus foregrounding the role of the political and the ideological, the constitutive 
role of power relations is at the heart of discourse theory. 
 
3. Methodology 
The empirical sections present a historical narrative on the establishment of the idea of 
individual savings arrangements in the Dutch policy discourse. For the purpose of this 
narrative, the rather abstract discourse theoretical concepts were operationalized in a 
specially designed four-step research method. In a first step I formulated the following 
guiding questions:    
 
1. How can former and new social law practices and discourses be characterized?  
2. How and why were these new practices and discourses installed?  
3. Why was there a lack of resistance of political subjects who embrace other values, such 
as solidarity and equality?  
 
In a second step almost 40 key actors in the policy process were interviewed, including 
(former) ministers, political representatives, representatives of social partners, officials 
and political advisors. These semi-structured interviews were completed with the 
readings of secondary literature. The interviews and the readings were, in the first place, 
helpful for the characterization of social law practices and discourses and the presence of 
fantasmatic narratives. Among other things, they revealed the impact of the introduction 
of the signifiers “life course” and “life course perspective” on the social security 
discourse. The three most influential documents referring to these signifiers were selected 
for a textual analysis. The interview data also served to guide the selection of another 8 
texts for textual analysis. Finally to study the discursive change within the most powerful 
political party, 4 additional texts were selected for textual analysis. 
 
The third step involved the analysis of the selected texts. Unlike Glynos and Howarth, 
who did not  themselves develop methodological tools for textual analysis, I examined 
discourse analytical tools developed in other approaches. The methodological tools  
developed for the purpose of Historical Discourse Analysis (DHA) seemed especially 
useful in this respect (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhart, 1999). DHA entails detailed 
study of texts. Every claim made in a text needs to be studied and categorized and DHA 
formulates a number of heuristic questions. Of these, the following three were of interest 
to this study: 
 
1. How are people, objects, phenomena/events, processes and actions named and referred 
to linguistically (strategies of nomination)? 
2. What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, objects, 
phenomena/events and processes (strategies of predication)? 
3. What arguments are employed in the discourse in question (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009: 
93)? 
 
Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhart (1999) use the third heuristic question to analyze 
the construction of national identities. They distinguish between strategies of 
justification, strategies of construction, transformative strategies and strategies of 
dismantling. For the present study these analytical categories were adapted to the 
structure of the analyzed texts. 
 
Together with the data from the interviews and the analysis of secondary literature, the 
(textual) analysis of argumentative strategies was also helpful, to figure out the ‘beatific’ 
or ‘horrific’ dimension in the narratives. I took the presence of incompatible elements as 
a rule of thumb to trace the fantasmatic dimensions in those narratives. 
 
In a fourth step I analyzed the social conflict that preceded the establishment of the LCA 
for the ways different identities (social groups) were either connected or kept separate. As 
such I sought to figure out how chains of equivalences and difference affected existing 
discourses and practices.  
 
4. Policy context 
The Dutch political system can be characterized as consensual, meaning that power over 
political decisions is distributed among different political party coalitions. After World 
War II,  the CDA (hereafter: Christian democrats) has been a constant presence in 
governing coalitions. Between 1994 and 2002, however, the Christian democrats were in 
the opposition and the Netherlands were governed by the other two important political 
parties -  the PvdA  (hereafter: social democrats) and the VVD (hereafter: liberals) - and 
the relatively small D66 (hereafter: liberal democrats). During their time in opposition, 
the Christian democrats refurbished its political position. One of these, based on the life 
course perspective and proposed in 2001 was a new social security system that was partly 
collective and partly based on individual savings. When the Christian democrats returned 
to power in 2002 as the largest party in the government coalition, they sought to actualize 
their proposed life-course-based social system. In 2010, after four subsequent 
governmental coalitions dominated by the Christian democrats, the Balkenende IV 
cabinet was succeeded by a coalition between the Christian democrats and the liberals 
headed by the liberal leader Rutte. 
 
The Dutch political system has also some corporatist elements. The influence countries 
labor unions and employers organizations is channeled in two important ways. First, the 
government must consult the tripartite Social Economic Council (SER) on every 
important socio-economic policy change. Second, twice a year the social partners united 
in the Labor Foundation discuss the terms of employment for the coming year with the 
central government. The most important labor unions are the FNV (hereafter: social 
democratic labor union) and the CNV (hereafter Christan labor union), of which the 
social democratic labor union is the largest by far. The largest employers’ organization is 
VNO-NCW (hereafter: employers’ confederation).  
 
5. The emergence of the idea on the “life course perspective” 
The Dutch social security has changed over the last few decades, slowly transforming 
itself from a system informed by notions of equality and solidarity to a system  
increasingly influenced by the values of freedom of choice and individual responsibility. 
Since the mid-1990s, in addition to the individual responsibility discourse, the Dutch 
social security system has increasingly been affected by discourses celebrating the 
introduction of marketization processes. These dominant discourses were challenged, 
however, by  counter discourses that objected to the increasing infiltration of the logic of 
the market into the social system. Other counter discourses emphasized the 
misrecognition of the worker as a ‘worker with care tasks’. Within this antagonistic field 
of dominant discourses and counter discourses, a new discourse coalition emerged around 
the theme of the “life course perspective.”  By discourse coalition I mean, following 
Hajer (1995) , “a group of actors that, in the context of an identifiable set of practices, 
shares the usage of a particular set of storylines over a particular period of time”(p. 70).  
 
Coming together just after the turn of the century, the actors of the “life course 
perspective discourse coalition” shared a set of storylines that gave expression to the idea 
that in our current day and age all people, women in particular, are combining more and 
more activities in their lives. As a result, there is a need for more flexibility and 
possibilities to take a break, especially during “life’s rush hour” when parents combine 
different tasks: taking care of their children and their own parents, making a career for 
themselves, and engaging in training and education. This discourse coalition included the 
Christian democrats, the social democrats, the liberal democrats, supporters of family 
policy and feminists. The socialist and Christian labor unions also supported this new 
idea. For the Christian labor union, the life course idea fitted in well with its affiliation 
with a family friendly social policy. For the socialist labor union, on the other hand, the 
new concept of the “life course perspective” not only expresses its new attention to the 
position of female workers, it also facilitated the shift towards individual responsibility, 
which had started in the mid-1990s. 
 
A Discourse Historical Analysis of a selection of key texts in the discourse on social 
security reform from 2001-2002 shows that the new signifiers “life course” and “life 
course perspective” established a new world view in this discourse: the world was now 
interpreted in terms of either “standard” or “modern” life courses, Whereas “standard life 
courses” were associated with “traditional”, “the past” and “static”, “modern life courses” 
are related to words such as “dynamic”, “free choice” and “change”. Other key signifiers 
in the studied texts, such as “risk” and “social security”, became meaningful in relation to 
these new signifiers. For example, “risk” was no longer considered an external event that 
could happen to any individual; “risk” was now viewed as an event that is dependent on 
individual “life course decisions”. Instead of being a new argument in a political struggle 
over ideas, the study thus suggests that the “life course perspective”, above all, facilitated 
a new way of seeing. Social security was now perceived in the perspective of an 
individual life course, which enables the view that individuals can anticipate future events  
  
The data from the interviews support the conclusion that the new way of looking at things 
provoked enthusiasm amongst involved policy actors. That is, for them, the idea on the 
“life course perspective” provided a way out of existing, deadlocked discussions on 
future social security design. Addressing win-win situations, the new signifiers reconciled 
different, formerly opposing, perspectives: advertising a more relaxed life style on one 
hand and promoting an increased labor participation on the other; encouraging the 
(collective) facilitation of more time and money for the caretaking of children on one 
hand and holding individuals responsible for care tasks on the other (Eleveld 2012).   
 
Participants in this new “life course discourse coalition” formulated diverse designs of a 
future ‘life course based’ social security system that, above all, responded to the “rush 
hour of life.” Most designs involved a mix of collective and individual savings, which 
enabled workers to take time off in order to take care of their children and/or their 
parents, to take educational leave or to enjoy a sabbatical.   
 
6. Changed ideas: the aging society narrative 
After 2002, when the Netherlands was hit by an economic crisis, the discourse coalition 
altered in important ways. The impact of the economic crisis on governmental policy was 
clear: the Balkenende II cabinet, a coalition of the Christian democrats, the liberals and 
the liberal democrats that would soon be named the “reform government”, forcefully 
argued that the slow economy was seriously threatening the Dutch welfare state. The 
aging society narrative added to the expressed concerns. According to this narrative, the 
economic crisis compelled the state to foster a higher and longer labor participation of the 
citizens to ensure a stable financial basis for the welfare state. This narrative particularly 
dominated the governmental discourse in the years between 2002 and 2005. In this period 
the slogan of the Balkenende II government was: “we cannot lose any more time (..) Big 
efforts are necessary to prevent definite future catastrophes from happening” (Van der 
Steen 2009, p. 310). In this context, the Balkenende II cabinet presented far-reaching 
social reforms, among which the gradual abolishment of the fiscal facilitation of early 
retirement provisions. 
 
The economic crisis and the aging society narrative seriously affected the discursive 
position of one of its most important and most powerful defenders, the Christian 
democrats. A Discourse Historic Analysis of Christian democrat documents between 
2001 and 2005 reveals that in 2001 the “life course perspective” referred to the 
decreasing quality of life, resulting from the lack of time and money for family life and 
leisure, whereas a few years later, it was, conversely, invoked to show how people could 
enhance their labor market participation. This discursive shift also affected the party’s 
ideas on life course policy. Whereas the Christian democrats had initially designed a 
partly collective “life course insurance” designed to balance work and family life, in 2004 
they argued for a comprehensive individual (savings) arrangement, a precautionary 
arrangement that encouraged full-time labor participation. It was believed that after a 
period of 10 to 20 years to reach full maturity, the LCA would become the starting point 
for an individualized social security system. 
  
The aging society narrative also affected the deliberations between the labor and 
employers’ unions in the SER, which had been asked to design a  “life course based 
social system” some months earlier. As one interviewee reported: 
 
 “Instead of talking about workers’ desires to take care of family, the discussions in the SER on a ‘life 
course based society’ rather addressed the theme of the ‘aging society’ (…). The general idea was that the 
collective money that was sunck in existing traditional social security arrangements could be used in a more 
productive way.”  
 
Above all, the discussions in the SER revealed a major controversy between the 
employers’ union, and the social democratic labor union. Although, as argued in the 
previous section, the social democratic labor union increasingly endorsed “individual 
responsibility” as one of the basic principles in social security arrangements, the labor 
union was also afraid to lose  “old collective social security rights.” Among other things, 
the union feared that a life course based system will threaten workers’ unemployment 
benefits in the long run. The employers’ confederation, on the other hand, which was a 
strong advocate of further flexibilization and individualization of social security 
arrangements, supported an exclusively individual savings scheme for the financing of 
leave. The continuing disagreement between the social democratic labor union and the 
employers’ confederation severely obstructed the proceedings in the SER. In May 2003, 
the SER deliberations came to an end. According to the official annual report of the SER 
for 2003, this was due to the reforms announced by the Balkenende II cabinet. Most 
respondents, however, believed that further SER negotiations were blocked because of 
the ongoing disagreement between the social partners. Moreover, as will be argued in the 
next section, the disagreement between two former supporters of the “life course 
perspective” seems to have been the first sign of a slow dissolution of the “life course 
perspective discourse coalition.” 
 
7. Disagreement, antagonism and compromise 
In the summer of 2003, as the economic situation worsened, the government decided to 
speed up the intended abolition of the fiscal facilitation of  its subsidy for early 
retirement. In addition, the government announced a series of major reforms of public 
disability and unemployment insurance schemes. Following strong protests from the 
labor unions, the social partners were allowed to negotiate the conditions for the abolition 
of the fiscal facilitation of early retirement arrangements and the establishment of the 
LCA in the Labor Foundation. 
 
The deliberations the Labor Foundation began in the spring of 2004. The social 
democratic labor union and the employers’ confederation having been unable to resolve 
their earlier disputes, found themselves back in the same antagonistic positions. 
Moreover, the announced abolition of the fiscal facilitation of early retirement drove the 
social partners further apart. Whereas the social democratic labor union sought to 
preserve the early retirement provisions, the employers’ confederation, which shared the 
fears of a tight labor market, tended to support most of the governmental plans. With  
negotiations limping along, Minister De Geus of Social Affairs and Employment 
accepted the labor union’s suggestion that workers be allowed to withdraw savings from 
the proposed LCA to finance early (full-time) retirement. The minister did not, however,  
give in to the demand of the social democratic labor union to allow workers to save 
within the LCA on a collective basis. In a later phase, though, he did permit the partial 
continuation of collective early retirement insurance on the condition that workers were 
allowed to opt out of the collective insurance scheme. For the unions, however, opting 
out was not acceptable, because it would destroy the collective system. Since the social 
democratic and the Christian labor union did not foresee any acceptable agreement, they 
let the negotiations to collapse. The government, in turn, announced that the reforms 
would be carried through without consulting the social partners any further. 
 
The labor unions were furious, now that the government had explicitly rejected them 
from the policy process. As an ultimate act of resistance, they called for a huge social 
demonstration in October 2004. The labor unions were not the only ones opposing the 
government. They were joined by a minority of the employers’ unions that shared their 
opinion that the government was increasingly marginalizing the role of the social partners 
in the policy process. In addition, the unions were joined by all kinds of other groups, 
including the entire left wing political opposition, which - like the unions - opposed 
further retrenchments of the welfare state. Calling for a reformed solidarity system, the 
new chain of equivalences channeled a generally felt anger against the harsh Balkenende 
government. The call for the mass demonstration encompassed the demands of different 
groups, such as the demands of those who, like the unions, wanted the collective social 
security system to be preserved, as well as students opposed to the increase in college 
fees, refugees and other members of ethnic minorities protesting their social exclusion, 
tenants, users of public transport, environmentalists and other opponents of the 
Balkenende cabinet. The formation of a new chain of equivalences was clearly described 
by van der Braak, a staff member of  employers’ confederation: “[the announced 
demonstration] increasingly becomes a political demonstration that can be characterized 
as a people’s front: Left, the labor union and the street against the right-wing 
government” (2006, p. 85). The establishment of these chains of equivalences thus 
definitively thwarted the former life course perspective discourse coalition. 
 
Interestingly, the emerging chain of equivalences also seems to have covered up the 
internal disputes within the social democratic labor union, where a struggle had been 
going on between (mainly) male staff members defending traditional pension rights and 
those advocating social reforms that would facilitate female labor participation. Whereas 
the life course perspective merged the interests of female workers, who wanted to balance 
work and family life, with the interests of male workers, who were striving for earlier 
retirement and a shorter work week, the proceedings in the Labor Foundation drove male 
and female interests further apart. Interviewees reported that female rank and file of the 
social democratic labor union’s in particular disagreed with linking the design of an LCA 
to the abolition of the fiscal facilitation of pre-pensions. Yet, at the protest march in 
October 2004 in Amsterdam, which turned out to be the biggest social protest march ever 
with 300,000 people marching against the Balkenende II cabinet, the internal differences 
within the social democratic labor union are set aside. Both male and female staff 
members reported about the euphoric atmosphere during the protest march and framed it 
as a successful act of resistance against the government and its individualization policy. 
Above all, they felt, the protest march put the labor union back on the map. 
 
At the beginning of November 2004, only a few days after the Labor Foundation of new 
negotiations between the labor unions and the government, the parties come to an 
agreement. According to the respondents present at the negotiations, the speedy 
agreement was due to the brute killing of controversial filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a 
Muslim fundamentalist on the second of November. The negotiating parties now realized 
that they had a common national responsibility and that their mutual quarrels had to be 
settled. They agreed on some important adjustments to the proposed reforms of the 
disability insurance as well as on some transitional early retirement provisions and 
amendments to the proposed LCA, which compensated for the abolishment of the 
collective early retirement arrangements. The parties decided to introduce an individual 
savings instrument in the social security law that not only made it easier for workers to 
accumulate leave time during life’s ‘rush hour of live’, but that also would enable them to  
compensate for the loss of the fiscal facilitation of early retirement arrangements. 
 
The new agreement was praised extensively in the media channels of the social 
democratic and the Christian labor union, which both celebrated the outcome of the 
November negotiations as a triumph for the labor unions. It was as if they had forgotten 
that most of the reforms of the Balkenende II cabinet were still in effect. According to  
De Geus, the minister of Social Affairs and Employment, the cabinet decided to let the 
unions celebrate their victory because the government had finally obtained their approval 
for further reforms: “We said to each other: ‘Okay, let it go, they have the flowers and we 
have the signatures’” (personal interview, 2009). As a matter of fact, even some 
interviewed union representatives admitted that the unions’ positive framing concealed 
the fact that the material outcome was not entirely positive for them. However, as they 
saw things, that was not what mattered. Above all, the protest march had put the labor 
unions back on the map. The cabinet ministers who had been involved admitted that  
unions would have been unable to come to an agreement with the government if not for 
the huge demonstration. The unions, they said, felt more secure after the protest march 
had taken place: it enabled them to make concessions to the government. 
 
Although the parties had decided that the LCA would take the form of an individual 
savings arrangement instead of a compulsory collective facility, which would have been 
the preference of the social democratic labor union, the 2004 compromise marked the 
start of important efforts by the unions to make a success of the LCA. Many of the  
collective agreements that were agreed upon in the following years contained specific 
regulations with regard to the LCA, particularly in support of the elderly workers. One 
might ask how it was possible for the social democratic labor union to accept a 
compromise containing elements it had strongly opposed just a month earlier. The present 
study suggests that the Balkenende government effectively decoupled the different 
demands by addressing the most important unions demand, even though it was not 
included in the call for the demonstration, namely (the idea of) regaining influence in the 
policy making process. This enabled the government not to give away too much with 
respect to the other demands. Thus the government successfully cut across the established 
chains of equivalences and restored the peace in the corporatist society. 
 
8. The LCA: “a monstrous design” 
The events preceding the political decision on the LCA, as well as the involvement of 
other stakeholders in the policy making process, determined to a great extent the final 
design of the LCA. As seen in the preceding section, the labor unions successfully argued 
in favor of using the LCA as an early retirement plan. Meanwhile, the Christian 
democrats paid a price for its new equivalent relationship with the right wing liberals. 
The chairman of the liberals, Zalm, who served as finance minister in the Balkenende II 
and III cabinets and a strong opponent of “subsidies on spare time.” only accepted the  
LCA on the condition that workers not to be allowed to simultaneously participate in the  
popular “wage savings arrangement”, a condition, as he now admits, that was designed to 
make the LCA fail (personal interview, 2009). Private insurers were a third stakeholder 
influencing the final LCA design. In contrast to Zalm and the labor unions, the private 
insurers supported the ideas of the Christian democrats because they anticipated a 
profitable market for their product as social security was further individualized and 
privatized. The Christian democrats, for their part, viewed the private insurers as tactical 
allies because they could promote the new arrangement in the market.  
 
The details of a future LCA were further elaborated by the Department of Social Affairs 
and Employment and the Department of Finance. Some officials at the former 
Department were very disappointed that, compared with the leave plan they had 
developed a year earlier at the behest of the Balkenende I cabinet, the emphasis had now 
shifted from a plan that would enable a combination of work and care activities to an 
early retirement scheme. As they saw it, the underlying idea of the leave arrangement had 
changed profoundly. Officials at both departments expected the compromise between 
Christian democrats and liberals to have a negative impact. Officials at the finance 
department also questioned the government’s interference with private savings in case of 
market failure, arguing that the fact that workers were not saving for leave simply means 
that there was no need for it. Perhaps most importantly, almost all interviewed officials 
said they were rather skeptic about the effects of the LCA on labor participation. Some of 
them felt that the whole idea of the life course perspective assumed that workers who 
participated in the LCA would remain longer in the labor market. One of the interviewed 
officials summarized the discontent as follows: “We all felt that we had to deal with a 
monstrous design.” 
 
9. Proposed extensions of the LCA and renewed resistance 
A year after the introduction of the LCA in 2006 no more than 5% of the workers were 
saving part of their wages under this arrangement, most of them for the purpose of early 
retirement. In order to make the LCA more attractive to workers, the new Balkenende IV 
cabinet decided to integrate the LCA with the aforementioned wage savings arrangement, 
extended the LCA to the self employed, and allowed participants to withdraw money 
from the account to finance periods “in between jobs” and the start-ups of a new 
businesses. A year later, the Labor Foundation launched similar proposals (The Labor 
Foundation, 2008). A few months after the Labor Foundation report was published the 
Labor Participation Committee, which had been organized to advise on labor market 
reforms, presented a plan for a mixed individual and collective savings arrangement 
modeled on the LCA, under which periods of unemployment can be financed. The 
proposed scheme partly replaces existing collective social security arrangements (Labor 
Participation Committee, 2008). 
 
The same year, the Department of Social Affairs and Employment and the Department of 
Finance were ordered to design a set of workable options in keeping with the 2007 
coalition agreement. Two options were extensively discussed: 
 
1. The LCA would be regulated under the income tax law (instead of the wage tax law) in 
order to include self-employed workers. People would only be allowed to withdraw 
money as an income substitute if they chose not to do paid work, but instead dedicated 
their time to (unpaid) care activities or training activities or if they had to finance a period 
between two jobs or the start-up of a business. 
2. As in the first option, the LCA would be regulated under the income tax law, but there 
would be no controls with regard to the purpose of withdrawals. 
 
Both options were rejected, however. Not only were they too expensive, they also had too 
many goals. Some interviewees reported that at that time it seemed as if new goals were 
formulated constantly being added to an LCA instrument already in existence. First, it 
had to be tailored to finance leave for care and educational activities. Then it also had to 
address the demand for a pre-retirement arrangement. Then, under the last proposals, it 
also had to cover periods of unemployment and help employees to set up their own 
businesses. One official explicitly blamed the “technocratic hobbyists” for the fruitless 
departmental discussions: “what had started with a small problem, the reconciliation of 
work and family life, had grown totally out of control”. In addition, some officials 
thought it unwise to include the self employed in the LCA, because in their view, the self 
employed tend to care for themselves by definition. For example, one official said: “Is 
this really a problem? Can you imagine the streets to be full of people demanding a life 
course arrangement for the self employed?” 
 
There were also doubts about the second option: Would participants really be willing to 
save for goals that extended their working life, such as financing leave for the purpose of 
care and education. As one respondent argued: “Why wouldn’t  they  use the savings to 
finance consumer goods, such as a mobile home?” According to these skeptical officials, 
the proposals no longer had anything to do with the objective of public social insurance. 
 
As a result, despite the intentions of the Balkenende IV cabinet and the advice of the 
social partners and the Labor Participation Committee, the LCA was not extended for the 
time being. Apart from objections by officials to the coalition plans, the more ambitious 
plan of the Labor Participation Committee was opposed by the unions out of fear that it 
might destroy the existing system of collective social insurance.  
 
10. The future of individual savings arrangements in the social security system 
Most of the key actors interviewed in 2009 and 2010 were pessimistic about the future of 
the LCA. Some of them referred to the technical details of the arrangement, such as the 
non-accumulation verdict resulting from the compromise between the liberals and the 
Christian democrats. Other respondents simply did not believe that the LCA could solve 
the problems of  life’s rush hour of life or the tight labor market. 
 
Despite the widespread pessimism, the idea of individual savings arrangements in the 
field of social security did not completely vanish from Dutch policy discourse. After two 
quiet years the Rutte cabinet, consisting of the Christian democrats and liberals, 
announced a “vitality plan” based on a new savings arrangement, the “vitality 
arrangement,” that would replace the LCA in 2013. The vitality arrangement was first 
and foremost a plan that would sustain the longer labor market participation necessary in  
aging society. Like the 2007 and 2008 proposals, the vitality arrangement allowed 
workers - including the self employed - to withdraw money from their individual account 
during periods when unemployed in order to stimulate “the transition from job to job.” 
Since the social partners had launched similar ideas a few years before (The Labor 
Foundation, 2008), it was no surprise that they supported this proposal, albeit on the 
condition that would still be possible to use the instrument to finance early retirement. 
 
By the year 2011, thanks to the aging society narrative, the idea of an individual savings 
arrangement has definitely shifted from an arrangement for the “rush hour of life” to a 
scheme to facilitate “job-to-job transitions,” obviously connecting the idea of an 
individual savings arrangement with the traditional collective unemployment insurance. 
 
11. A discourse theoretical approach to ideas and policy change 
Reflecting on the rhetorical rediscription presented in the preceding empirical sections, 
we now seek to answer our initial question about how and why new ideas on individual 
savings arrangements affected Dutch social policy. 
 
First of all, we saw that in the 1990s some counter discourses increasingly challenged the 
existing logics of the social security system (solidarity, breadwinner system, etc.). Put 
otherwise, a gap seems to have been opened up between the term social security and its 
meaning. This gap was soon filled up with the terms “life course” and “life course 
perspective.” These terms, like a dislocationary event, facilitated a glimpse of the 
universal, of another way of doing things. They made people “see things” in a novel way 
(i.e. aspect dawning). It was easy to identify with these new signifiers, because they 
responded to a fantasmatic demand for a new fullness in a discursive field that was 
increasingly immersed in counter discourses. As such, the new names united formerly 
dominant discourses and counter discourses.   
 
In addition, instead of being just one idea, strategically proposed by policy actors, the 
new terms, in the process of deliberation, came to constitute a new world view, which 
confirms Finlayson’s claim that the process of argumentation cannot be separated from 
the formation of a consensus. Thus new rhetoric changed the categorical pre-conditions 
of the social security discourse and thus changed existing social security discourse.  
 
Following the 2003 dislocationary events, the economic crisis and the announced 
cutbacks in social expenditure, chains of equivalences between different demands were 
constructed against the hegemonic neo-liberal policy of the Balkenende II regime. This 
process was sustained by a strong fantasmatic aging society narrative, which expressed 
the fear that the Dutch welfare state would soon become unstable if nothing was done to 
increase the labor supply. The aging-society narrative profoundly altered the meaning of 
the “life course perspective” within the context of hegemonic neo-liberal regime, putting 
the emphasis on individual precautionary measures that would enhance labor 
participation. Since the former partners in the life course discourse coalition had become 
antagonists, it is necessary to ask how the adoption of the LCA was achieved.   
 
The study suggests, first of all, that the government effectively decoupled different 
demands. The unions wanted more than anything to reestablish their position as serious 
contenders, so they were given credit for the victory in negotiations, as a result of which 
the government could cut across the established chain of equivalences and restore peace 
in the corporatist society. The working of the logics of difference thus allowed the 
government to go on with its neoliberal program, including the introduction of an 
individual LCA.  Moreover, the working of the logics of difference was reinforced by 
fears about both an aging society and Muslim fundamentalists, which, according to the 
involved policy actors, necessitated them taking a collective stand for a stable Dutch 
welfare state. By creating an external enemy, the  fantasy effectively sustained the logics 
of difference of the neo-liberal government. 
 
On the other hand, the logics of difference also seem to have contributed to the failure of 
the LCA, i.e. the decoupling of demands implied that the government had given in to 
some of the union demands. For example, the LCA could now be used effectively as an 
alternative for collective pre-pension arrangements. Acceptance of the liberal demand to 
maintain the wage savings arrangement as a separate arrangement further weakened the 
LCA. 
 
Another important factor was the position of policy officials who, positioned themselves 
as “non-believers,” and hindered any further extension of the LCA. Their “silent 
resistance” against the hegemonic policy regime reveals an ongoing defect of social 
structures. Their resistance against the construct of the subject as a self-responsible life 
planner seems to have been supported by the public, as demonstrated by its low degree of 
participation in the arrangement.  
 
Nonetheless, despite the resistance of both the public and the officials, the idea of 
individual savings arrangements has been firmly established in the Dutch policy 
discourse. How did this happen? The poststructuralist discourse theoretical approach 
answers this question in three steps. First, the “life course perspective” enabled a new 
way of seeing and, as such, constituted new social logics. Social security was now 
perceived in terms of individual life courses, which opened up the possibility of 
introducing individual savings arrangements in the traditional collective system of social 
insurance. Second, the working of the logics of equivalence and difference secured the 
support of the labor unions for this novel arrangement. Third, various forms of (silent) 
opposition were effectively resisted because identification with a strongly fantasmatic 
aging-society narrative continued to nourish the urge for social reforms. 
 
12. Conclusion 
This study shows that a discourse theoretical approach is able to overcome some of the 
problems raised by ideational analysis. The study reveals, first, how ideas change and  
why policy actors can identify with the new ideas. It  further shows that research should 
not focus on how policy actors move from ideas to action. In fact, ideas cannot be 
separated from actions; as illustrated in the preceding account, ideas emerge and change 
because of the use of rhetoric, discursive interactions, (fantasmatically based) 
identification processes and the working of the logics of equivalence and difference, 
processes largely beyond the control of intentionally acting individual policy actors. 
While the new rhetoric accounted for the conditions of the possibility, the working of the 
logics of equivalence and difference, ultimately determined what a reformed Dutch social 
policy would look like. In addition, insights from Lacanian psychoanalytics proved to be 
helpful in explaining why subjects identified with certain narratives. Thus this study 
shows how the constitutive role of power relations remain at the centre of a discourse 
theoretical explanation of policy change.  
 
A question can be raised, however, as to how the discourse theoretical concept of agency 
differs from the concept of the “situated agent” in interpretive approaches. For example, 
apart from the fact that discourse theory explains why subjects identify with certain 
narratives, it is not clear how situated agents who identify with a particular narrative, 
such as the aging society narrative, can be distinguished from the internally split subjects 
who identify with the same narrative in his/her constant search for new fullness.  
 
The failure of discourse theory to present a full-blown alternative to more conventional 
approaches to the analysis of policy change, it would seem, is due to the fact that 
discourse theoretical concepts, despite its empirical ambitions, are mostly presented on a 
philosophical level of analysis. They are abstract concepts designed for a macro level of 
analysis. This is, of course, helpful to the extent that the context is dominated by ideology 
and other macro-level cultural venues, but additional analytical tools are needed to 
explain why certain policy ideas (and others not) are successful within a relatively small 
group of policy actors. For this purpose the study recommended the deployment of tools 
that are developed in the field of Discourse Historical Analysis. Hajer’s concept of 
discourse coalition also proved to be useful. It explains, above all, how rhetorical moves 
can encourage the merging of disparate discursive positions in policy discourses. It is 
hoped that scholarly research will deploy and further develop DHA, the concept of 
discourse coalition and other (middle range) concepts for the purpose of a discourse 
theoretical engagement with the study of policy change.  
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